Mercer Law Review
Volume 66
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 9

12-2014

Domestic Relations
Barry B. McGough
Elinor H. Hitt
Katherine S. Cornwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
McGough, Barry B.; Hitt, Elinor H.; and Cornwell, Katherine S. (2014) "Domestic Relations," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 66 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol66/iss1/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Domestic Relations
by Barry
B. McGough °
Elinor H. Hitt**
and Katherine S. Cornwell*.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses significant case law that arose during the
survey period.1 There were no extensive statutory changes specific to
domestic relations during this period, though legislation was passed by
the Georgia General Assembly providing limitations on personal
information allowed in court filings.

II.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Two cases during the survey period addressed questions of subject
matter jurisdiction. In Crutchfield v. Lawson,' the parties divorced in
Paulding County, and the former wife filed a subsequent contempt action
in Cobb County. The former husband challenged Cobb County's
jurisdiction, though at a hearing the parties had consented to the court's
jurisdiction on the record. After the husband was held in contempt, he
moved to set aside the contempt judgment based on a lack of subject

* Partner in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of California at Berkley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B.,
1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); University of Georgia (M.S.W., 1996);
Georgia State University (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (B.A., 2008); University of Georgia
School of Law (J.D., 2012). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This Survey focuses on developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2013 to May 31, 2014. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the
prior survey period, see Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations,Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 107 (2013).
2. 294 Ga. 407, 754 S.E.2d 50 (2014).
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Subject matter jurisdiction is the power or

authority to hear a class of cases, and "may not be waived by consent of
the parties." Superior courts have the authority to hear an action for
contempt of a Georgia divorce decree; thus, subject matter jurisdiction
5
in the superior court was proper.
The real issue was which superior court could properly hear this
8
particular case-a question of venue. However, venue may be waived
or conferred by consent, as happened here when the parties consented
7
on the record to the case being heard in Cobb County. The trial court's
8
judgment was affirmed.
In Barfield v. Butterworth,' the subject matter jurisdiction of a
10
On April
superior court versus that of a probate court was at issue.
court
superior
in
a
petition
filed
grandmother
maternal
13, 2012, the
paternal
the
2012,
25,
April
On
H.H.
grandchild,
her
of
seeking custody
grandmother was issued letters of temporary guardianship over H.H. by
the probate court. The paternal grandmother moved to dismiss the
maternal grandmother's custody petition, arguing the superior court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the letters of temporary
guardianship she obtained. The trial court properly denied the
motion. 1"
The temporary guardianship did not deprive the superior court of
jurisdiction to determine whether permanent custody should be awarded
12
"Superior courts have 'original
to the maternal grandmother.
jurisdiction over contests for permanent child custody ... between
parents, parents and third parties, or between parties who are not
parents.'"' 3 Further, as a custody dispute between non-parents, the
matter was required to be determined according to the best interests of
the child.' 4 The temporary guardianship did not preclude the custody

3. Id. at 407-08, 754 S.E.2d at 51.
4. Id. at 409, 754 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Robinson v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga. App.
141, 144, 189 S.E. 555, 558 (1937)).

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 410, 754 S.E.2d at 52-53.
8. Id. at 410, 754 S.E.2d at 53.
9. 323 Ga. App. 156, 746 S.E.2d 819 (2013).
10. Id. at 156, 746 S.E.2d at 820.
11. Id. at 156-57, 746 S.E.2d at 820.
12. Id. at 160, 746 S.E.2d at 823.
13. Id. at 158, 746 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting Stone-Crosby v. Mickens-Cook, 318 Ga. App.
313, 314, 733 S.E.2d 842, 844 (2012)).
14. Id. at 159, 746 S.E.2d at 822.
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proceeding, and any resulting custody award would supersede the
temporary guardianship. 5
Court filings are now to be redacted in a manner which precludes
inclusion of certain sensitive information, including complete dates of
birth, social security numbers, tax identification numbers, and financial
account numbers. 6 The birth year may be included, but not the day
or month, and only the last four digits of the other numbers may be
used.' 7
III.

DISCOVERY

8
Rutter,"

In Rutter v.
the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
Georgia Court of Appeals. 9 During the parties' divorce case, the
husband moved to exclude evidence that the wife derived from video
surveillance devices surreptitiously installed in the marital residence. 0
The husband argued that the wife's use of the devices was a violation
of section 16-11-62(2) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.), 2 ' which makes it unlawful for one to conduct video surveillance of another in a private place, out of public view, and without his
consent.22 Evidence obtained in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-6223 is
not admissible in court.'
In denying the husband's motion to exclude, the trial court relied on
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(2XC), which provides an exception to the general
prohibition and expressly permits one to conduct video surveillance of
persons "within the curtilage of [her own] residence" for "security
purposes, crime prevention, or crime detection."' The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court, holding that subparagraph (2XC) survived a
2000 amendment to the statute.26 In reversing the lower court, the
supreme court held that the 2000 amendment eliminated the "curtilage"

15. Id. at 160, 746 S.E.2d at 823.
16. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7.1 (2014). There are certain exemptions made to this general rule.

See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7.1(c).
17. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7.1(a).
18. 294 Ga. 1, 749 S.E.2d 657 (2013).
19. Id. at 2, 749 S.E.2d at 658.
20. Id. at 1, 749 S.E.2d at 657.
21. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(2) (2011).
22. Rutter, 291 Ga. at 1 & n.1, 749 S.E.2d at 657 & n.1; see also O.C.GA § 16-11-62(2).
23. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 (2011).
24. O.C.GA § 16-11-67 (2011).
25. Rutter, 291 Ga. at 1 & n.2, 749 S.E.2d at 657-58 & n.2 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-1162(2XC)).

26. Id. at 2, 749 S.E.2d at 658.
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exception of subparagraph (2XC) by implication and the evidence should
have been excluded.2 7
IV.

FAMILY VIOLENCE

In Mandt v. Lovell,' the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine under what circumstances, if any, a trial court, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 19-13-4,29 may subsequently modify a permanent protective order (PPO). ° Based on changed circumstances, the trial court
partially granted the father's motion to terminate a family violence PPO
entered against him two years earlier. 1
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals in holding that
the trial court had the authority to terminate portions of the PPO even
though the court term in which the PPO was entered had expired.3 2
Generally, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to make material changes to a
final order after the expiration of the term of court in which it was
entered. 3
Yet, "fj]udgments that govern continuing or recurring
courses of conduct may be subject to modification even though the power
of doing so is not expressly provided."4 A PPO is a continuing judgment, and therefore is subject to modification at any time based upon
changed circumstances.35
V. LEGITIMATION
Administrative legitimation was spotlighted in two cases reviewed by
the Georgia Court of Appeals this survey period. In Ray v. Hann,36 the
minor child, A.C.R., was born out-of-wedlock in 2008.37 Before leaving
the hospital, Ray, the father, and Peterson, the mother, signed an
acknowledgment of paternity and legitimation which provided that Ray's
relationship with A.C.R. "shall be considered legitimate
for all purposes
38
under the law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(gX2)."

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 2-3, 749 S.E.2d at 658-59.
293 Ga. 807, 750 S.E.2d 134 (2013).
O.C.G.A. § 19-13-4 (2010).
Mandt, 293 Ga. at 808, 750 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 807-08, 750 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 808-10, 750 S.E.2d at 135-37.
See id.at 809, 750 S.E.2d at 136.

34.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 73 cmt. b (1982)).

35.
36.
37.
38.
2014);

Id. at 810, 750 S.E.2d at 136.
323 Ga. App. 45, 746 S.E.2d 600 (2013).
Id. at 45, 746 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 45-46, 746 S.E.2d at 602; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(gX2) (2010 & Supp.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-46.1 (2010).
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In 2012, A.C.R.'s stepfather filed a petition to adopt the child, and Ray
filed a petition to legitimate and opposed the stepparent adoption. The
trial court was aware of the acknowledgment of paternity and legitimation; however, the court granted the stepfather's adoption petition,
denied Ray's petition to legitimate, and terminated Ray's parental
rights.3 9 The court of appeals held that the trial court's denial of Ray's
petition to legitimate was an abuse of discretion. 4' The acknowledgment of paternity and legitimation rendered Ray's relationship with
A.C.R. legitimate, and Ray remained the child's legal father "unless and
until his parental rights have been terminated."4 1
In Allifi v. Raider,42 a different outcome occurred.4 The day aier
the birth of T.R. in 2008, the mother and the father signed an acknowledgment of paternity and legitimation. In September 2010, the father
filed a petition to legitimate T.R., which was denied. The trial court
found that, based on the evidence of the father's drug use and irresponsible behavior, legitimation was not in T.R.'s best interest. The father
moved to set aside the judgment denying his legitimation petition, and
that motion was granted. The trial court found that the original order
was based upon a mistake of fact and was pre-empted by the parties'
acknowledgment of legitimation." The appellate court determined this
was error because a party is precluded from setting aside a judgment on
a ground which he knew or could have discovered through reasonable
diligence. 4' The father was aware of his voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity at the time he filed his legitimation petition, and he should
have brought it to the trial court's attention prior to judgment on his
legitimation petition. 46 The father cannot now use the existence of this
document as a basis to set aside the trial court's final judgment
thereon.47
VI.

CHILD CUSTODY

While the appellate courts reviewed numerous appeals regarding child
custody during this survey period, four cases of note are highlighted

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Ray, 323 Ga. App. at 46, 746 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 47, 746 S.E.2d at 603.
Id.
323 Ga. App. 510, 746 S.E.2d 763 (2013).
See id. at 514, 746 S.E.2d at 766-67.
Id. at 510-11, 746 S.E.2d at 764-65.
Id. at 513, 746 S.E.2d at 766.
Id.
Id.
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herein. In Sahibzada v. Sahibzada,5 international travel restrictions
were at issue. 49 The trial court entered a final decree of divorce, which
provided that, until they reached the age of sixteen, the parties' two
minor sons could not travel outside the United States without the wife's
consent.5" The supreme court affirmed the lower court because the
evidence showed that the husband frequently travelled outside the
country without communicating his whereabouts to his wife, the
paternal relatives could travel to the United States to visit the children,
and the wife may have difficulty asserting her custodial rights in
Pakistan where she was a non-citizen and her husband was a citizen.5
In Donohoe v. Donohoe, " access to records of the Department of
Family and Children's Services (DFACS) were at issue.53 Two reports
had been made to DFACS regarding the custodial father's treatment of
the parties' minor child.54 The mother "filed a motion for subpoena of
the DFACS records.. ., asking the trial court to review the records to
determine if the records were necessary to resolve any issues before the
court and, if so, to release those records to the parties."55 The court did
not rule on the mother's motion. However, in rendering its final order,
the trial court noted it had reviewed the DFACS records and used
information from the records in reaching its verdict.5" The court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in relying on the DFACS records,
as the records were never entered into evidence and no one from DFACS
testified, and the court erred in declining to provide the mother access
to the records. 7
Driver v. Sene5" reminds us that even when there is a material
change in circumstances that would justify a modification of child
custody, such a change still must be in the child's best interest. The
father petitioned to modify custody, seeking primary custody of the
parties' three children who were seventeen, fifteen, and twelve. The
trial court granted the petition regarding the oldest child and it denied
the request to change custody of the two youngest children. The father

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

294 Ga. 783, 757 S.E.2d 51 (2014).
Id. at 783-84, 757 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 783, 757 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 785-86, 757 S.E.2d at 53-54.
323 Ga. App. 473, 746 S.E.2d 185 (2013).
Id. at 474, 746 S.E.2d at 186.
Id.
Id.

56. Id. at 475, 477, 746 S.E.2d at 186-87, 188.

57. Id. at 477, 746 S.E.2d at 188.
58.

327 Ga. App. 275, 758 S.E.2d 613 (2014).
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appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to honor his fifteenyear-old son's affidavit of election to live with him. 9
The court of appeals upheld the lower court's ruling, finding that the
election of a child fourteen or older to live with one parent over the other
is presumptive, but the election may be overridden based on the child's
best interest.6" The evidence showed that the fifteen-year-old has a
developmental disorder, which required medication, specialized
education, therapy, and counseling; the mother had historically been
more involved in the child's care; and the child vacillated in his election
of the custodial parent during the litigation. 6'
A custody dispute between a parent and third party was the subject
2 a case involving the presumption
of appeal in Entrekin v. Friedman,"
that a surviving parent is entitled to custody.63 This presumption can
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the surviving parent
is unfit.64 After the custodial father's death, the paternal aunt refused
to return the child to the mother. The mother filed a writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied, and the aunt filed a petition for custody,
which was granted. 5
The supreme court upheld the lower court.6 6 Evidence supported the
trial court's finding that the mother was unfit: the mother had struggled
with alcohol and drug addiction; she had a criminal history and other
misconduct related to her addictions; and she was unaware of the child's
special needs, notwithstanding her access to the child's educational and
medical records.67
VII. CHILD SUPPORT
During this survey period, the appellate courts highlighted the
necessity of adhering to statutorily correct procedures in preparing child
support orders. In Demmons v. Wilson-Demmons,68 the supreme court
vacated and remanded the trial court's final order in the parties' divorce
action because the final order failed to include "a written finding of the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 275, 758 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 277, 758 S.E.2d at 616.
Id. at 277-78, 758 SXE.2d at 616.
294 Ga. 429, 754 S.E.2d 14 (2014).
See id. at 430, 754 S.E.2d at 16.
Id.
Id. at 429, 754 S.E.2d at 15-16.
Id. at 429, 754 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 430-31, 754 S.E.2d at 16-17.
293 Ga. 349, 745 S.E.2d 645 (2013).
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parent[s'] gross income[s] as determined by the court." 9 The court
explained that the order would not have been remanded if the court had
simply incorporated the gross monthly income from a child support
worksheet into the final order through attachment therein.70
In Williamson v. Williamson,7 the father filed a petition to modify
child support and custody, and following a trial, the court ruled that the
parties would continue to have joint custody but allocated 60% of
parenting time to the father and 40% to the mother.72 The court also
ordered the father to pay child support to the mother, but the amount
was reduced by a parenting-time deviation for the father's increased
parenting time.78
The father appealed, arguing that the final order made him the
"custodial parent," and therefore, the court erred in requiring him to pay
child support to the mother.74 The supreme court disagreed, stating
that the final order did not explicitly find either party to be the custodial
parent and that it was not necessary for the order to include such
information. 7 However, because the order awarded the father more
than 50% of the parenting time, the father was the custodial parent, and
the mother was the non-custodial parent for purposes of applying the
child support guidelines.7" The court referred to James v. James,7 7
which held that a court may require a custodial parent to pay child
support to the non-custodial parent
where it is in the best interests of
7
78
the child to do so for support.
Consequently, the court reversed and remanded the trial court's order
because the trial court improperly decreased the father's child support
by applying a parenting-time deviation when a parenting-time deviation
may only be applied to a non-custodial parent's child support amount.80
In Crook v. Crook,8 the supreme court reversed and remanded the
trial court's order on the mother's petition for modification of child

69. Id. at 349, 745 S.E.2d at 646 (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-615(c)(2)(C) (2010)).
70. Id. at 349-50, 745 S.E.2d at 464.
71. 293 Ga. 721, 748 S.E.2d 679 (2013).
72. Id. at 721-22, 748 S.E.2d at 679.
73. Id. at 722, 748 S.E.2d at 679-80.
74. Id. at 722, 748 S.E.2d at 680.
75. Id. at 722-23, 748 S.E.2d at 680.
76. Id. at 723, 748 S.E.2d at 680; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-15(aX9), (a)(14) (2010).
77. 246 Ga. 233, 271 S.E.2d 151 (1980).
78. Id. at 233, 271 S.E.2d at 152.
79. Williamson, 293 Ga. at 724, 748 S.E.2d at 681.
80. Id. at 726, 748 S.E.2d at 682-83; see O.C.GA. § 19-6-15(a)(17) (2010).
81. 293 Ga. 867, 750 S.E.2d 334 (2013).
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custody and support because the order failed to comply with the
statutory guideline requiring the inclusion of findings of fact. s2 The
trial court's order did not incorporate a child support worksheet and
made no findings regarding the presumptive amount of child support or
deviations but merely stated that the father's child support obligation
was $1,000 per month because of shared custody and the history of the
parties.' It is clear from the appellate court's holdings, above, that
trial courts must strictly adhere to the child support guidelines in
drafting final orders.
The supreme court's holding in Strunk v. Strunk" involved a variety
of child support related issues.' The mother appealed the trial court's
downward modification of child support sought by the father.8 The
supreme court upheld the trial court's finding that the father's "new
employment [as a mortgage loan processor] and the economic realities
of the mortgage industry constituted a material change of circumstances"
warranting a downward modification of child support where "the
industry has been unstable, downsizing, and affected by the reces87
sion.

In keeping with the appellate courts' trend regarding strict adherence
to child support guidelines, the court reversed the portion of the trial
court's order related to the father's $200-per-month travel deviation
because the order failed to state the reasoning behind departing from the
presumptive amount to grant the deviation. 8 The court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a downward adjustment to the father's gross income due to his newborn child living in his
home because the father testified about the relationship at the hearing
but failed to present documentary evidence of his parent-child relationship, and the mother failed to argue this issue at the hearing.89
Finally, the court reversed the portion of the trial court's order that
set forth a payment schedule for the father's child support arrearage.Y°
The trial court ordered the father to pay $96,000 owed in child support
arrearage by paying "$250 per month until the child support obligation
ended and then $1,000 per month until the arrearage was paid in

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 867, 869, 750 S.E.2d at 335, 336.
Id. at 867-68, 750 S.E.2d at 335-36.
294 Ga. 280, 754 S.E.2d 1 (2013).
Id. at 280, 754 S.E.2d at 2.

86. Id.
87.

Id. at 280-82, 754 S.E.2d at 2-3.

88. Id. at 282, 754 S.E.2d at 3.
89. Id. at 282-83, 754 S.E.2d at 4.
90. Id. at 284, 754 S.E.2d at 5.
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full."' The supreme court, citing Department of Human Resources v.
Chambers,9 2 stated that a court may not order the postponement of
9
child support payments until the child reaches the age of eighteen. "
Further, the trial court exceeded its authority in addressing the
arrearages because the parties were before the court on a modification
action, and "the trial court calculates in a contempt action the past-due
child support and 'does not determine in a modification petition whether
and how94much the petitioner is in arrears on his child support payments.'"
The case of Riddell v. Riddell95 supplies an important practice tip.
In Riddell, the mother filed a contempt action against the father for
failure to pay child support, and the father fied a petition for downward
modification of child support. At a hearing on both matters, the court
held the father in contempt and denied his petition for modification
based upon the father's failure to present evidence of his income and
financial status at the time of his last modification action in 2009.96
However, the record from the hearing showed that the father
requested the trial court to examine the full record of this case, which
included the 2009 order setting forth both parties' incomes. The trial
97
court refused to do so, and the father filed a motion for new trial. In
denying the father's motion, the trial court ordered the father to pay the
mother's attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b),98 and the
father appealed. 99 In reversing the order, the supreme court stated
that a party's request for the court to consider findings made in a prior
modification action "is not without substantial justification, as [it has]
previously held that 'a trial court may take judicial cognizance . . . of
records on file in its own court."'0°0
The case of Friday v. Friday'' sets forth a helpful procedural tip, as
well. In Friday, the father filed a motion to modify child support, and
the mother fied a motion for contempt against the father for non-

91. Id. at 281, 754 S.E.2d at 3.
92. 211 Ga. App. 763, 441 S.E.2d 77 (1994).
93. Strunk, 294 Ga. at 283, 754 S.E.2d at 4.
94. Id. at 284, 754 S.E.2d at 4-5 (quoting Morgan v. Bunzendahl, 316 Ga. App. 338,
340, 729 S.E.2d 476, 478 (2012)).
95. 293 Ga. 249, 744 S.E.2d 793 (2013).
96. Id. at 249-50, 744 S.E.2d at 794.
97. Id. at 250, 744 S.E.2d at 794.
98. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2014).
99. Riddell, 293 Ga. at 250, 744 S.E.2d at 794.
100. Id. at 251, 744 S.E.2d at 795 (second alteration in original) (quoting Petkas v.
Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108, 312 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1984)).
101. 294 Ga. 687, 755 S.E.2d 707 (2014).
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payment of child support. Upon adjudicating both claims, the trial court
entered an order finding that the father had a substantial change in
income and financial circumstance warranting a downward modification
of child support, but also found the father in contempt for failure to pay
child support. °2
The father appealed the order, arguing that the trial court erred by
finding him in contempt since, from the time he lost his job to the
present, the father had been paying a decreased amount of child support
based upon the child support guidelines and his monthly unemployment
benefits.' 3 Although the supreme court disagreed with the father's
reasoning, the court explained that, pursuant to O.C.G.A § 19-615(j), 1°4 "the modification of child support is prospective only, but if a
question is presented on a petition for contempt, any amount of
arrearages due that would be due under the prior order, but were
attributable to lost income, do not accrue from the date of service of the
petition.""°5
VIII.

EQUITABLE DIVIsION

While the appellate courts handed down numerous decisions during
this survey period that involved the equitable division of marital
property, three Georgia Supreme Court decisions, as set forth below,
were of particular interest.
First, the case of White v. Howard'°8 involved the husband's obligation under the divorce decree "to obtain a term life insurance policy in
the amount of $100,000, naming [the wife] as the beneficiary," and to
maintain the policy for twelve years. 0 7 Following the wife's remarriage, the husband filed a motion for relief, seeking to terminate the
provision since his obligation to maintain the policy was classified as
periodic alimony, and thus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b),' 08
terminable upon the wife's remarriage. In granting the wife's motion to
dismiss, the trial court held that the husband's insurance obligation fell
into the "equitable division" category of property since it was set for a
definite period of time, and therefore not terminable by operation of law
and not subject to modification.' 9

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 688, 755 S.E.2d at 709-10.
Id. at 690, 755 S.E.2d at 711.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(j) (Supp. 2014).
Friday,294 Ga. at 691, 755 S.E.2d at 711.
295 Ga. 210, 758 S.E.2d 824 (2014).
Id. at 210, 758 S.E.2d at 826.

108. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b) (2010).
109.

White, 295 Ga. at 210-11, 213, 758 S.E.2d at 826, 828.
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In reversing the trial court's holding, the supreme court restated its
holding from Rivera v. Rivera11 ° and held that the insurance provision
could not be classified as an equitable division of property since the
amount and duration were indefinite due to the fact that both depended
on "the unknowable fact of how long [the husband] lives.""' Further,
the court held that the provision could not be classified as lump-sum
alimony, since the amount of the death benefits was contingent on future
events-the husband's death-that prevented the calculation of the exact2
number and amount of payments at the time of the divorce decree."
The court held that the life insurance requirement was periodic alimony,
and therefore modifiable upon the wife's remarriage."' Interestingly,
the parties' divorce decree stated that "[n]either Plaintiff nor Defendant
shall pay or receive alimony and.., the life insurance requirement was
not alimony."" 4 In reconciling its holding with the language of the
decree, the court relied on Moore v. Moore,"5 stating, "Neither the
parties'6 nor the trial court's characterization of an award is controlling.""

Second, in Arthur v. Arthur,"' the court reversed in part the trial
court's holding based upon two errors contained in the parties' divorce
decree."' The decree awarded the wife the marital residence, but
required [the wife] to use her best effort to refinance the indebtedness
in order to remove [the husband] from the indebtedness and generate
funds to pay [the husband] $20,000 for his interest in the marital home
and, if not successful in refinancing the home, then "in the event the
house is sold in the future" to pay said sum to [the husband] with
interest from the date of the decree." 9
The supreme court held that the decree failed to include sufficient
findings of fact to support the award of the marital residence to the
wife. 2 ° Because the husband filed his written request for findings of
fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a),' 2 ' after

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

283 Ga. 547, 661 S.E.2d 541 (2008).
White, 295 Ga. at 212-13, 758 S.E.2d at 827-28.
Id. at 212, 213, 758 S.E.2d at 827, 828.
Id. at 213, 758 S.E.2d at 828.
Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
286 Ga. 505, 690 S.E.2d 166 (2010).
White, 295 Ga. at 213, 758 S.E.2d at 828.
293 Ga. 63, 743 S.E.2d 420 (2013).
Id. at 64, 67, 743 S.E.2d at 422, 424.
Id. at 63, 743 S.E.2d at 422.
Id. at 66, 743 S.E.2d at 423-24.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) (2014).
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the hearing but prior to the judgment being entered, his request was
timely.'2 2 The court explained that, upon a timely O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a)
request, the court must, at a minimum, produce a judgment that
contains sufficient findings of fact to "clarify the rationale used by the
trial court to reach its result.""2 The court further explained, "The
degree of detail ...

in findings of fact in a final judgment awarding

equitable division of marital property should... depend upon the degree
of complexity of the issues." 24
Finally, in Sullivan v. Sullivan,"2 the husband had purchased stock
in a closely-held corporation prior to the marriage, and the wife claimed
that the appreciation on the premarital stock was subject to equitable
division. In attempting to prove the amount of appreciation that
occurred, the wife offered two valuations regarding the amount of
appreciation. The trial court rejected both of the wife's valuations and
found that there was no evidence
of the amount of appreciation that
126
occurred during the marriage.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court stated that the trial
court has discretion to select the valuation method to be utilized, and
likewise has discretion to reject any and all methods presented. 1 7
IX.

APPEALS

Payne,28

In Miles v.
the timeliness of the appeal was in question.2 9 In this custody-modification action, an order denying the
mother's petition for custody and a
judgment [awarding the father] attorney fees were each marked with
stamps reading "Filed with the Court," followed by a line, under which
was printed "J.David Roper, Judge"; a handwritten signature appeared
on the line and beside the signature, the handwritten date "11-26-12."
The order and judgment also each contained stamps showing they were
"Filed For Record" with the clerk of the superior court on November 27,
2012. i30
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Arthur, 293 Ga. at 65, 743 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 66, 743 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting Crowder v. Crowder, 281 Ga. 656, 658, 642
97, 99 (2007)).
Id.
295 Ga. 24, 757 S.E.2d 129 (2014).
Id. at 24, 25, 26-27, 757 S.E.2d at 131, 132-33.
Id. at 26, 27, 757 S.E.2d at 132, 133.
327 Ga. App. 191, 755 S.E.2d 551 (2014).
Id. at 191, 755 S.E.2d at 552.
Id.
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The mother's notice of appeal was filed with the superior court clerk on
December 27, 2012, but upon review, the court of appeals concluded it
was untimely.'3' While the mother filed her appeal within thirty days
from the date the order and judgment were filed in the clerk's office,
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(e) 132 creates an exception to this general rule,
133
allowing a judge to file orders and note his or her own filing date.
In such circumstance, the judge's filing date is the date that begins the
time for filing an appeal.' 3 4
X.

CONTEMPT

During this survey period, the appellate courts upheld several trial
court orders on contempt, fashioning more liberal remedies as compared
to similar orders in years prior. This trend is exemplified in the two
following cases.
In Smith v. Smith,'3 5 per the parties' final decree, the husband was
obligated to relinquish certain items of personal property to the wife.
The items were thought to be located within the marital residence,
which the husband occupied during the divorce proceedings. However,
when the wife took possession of the home, the items had disappeared
and the husband claimed no knowledge of the whereabouts of the items.
The wife filed a contempt action against the husband, and the trial court
found the husband in contempt after the wife presented evidence
establishing the fair market value of the property, as well as evidence
that the husband had removed at least one truckload of items from the
home. 136
The trial court ordered the husband to purge his contempt by paying
the wife the fair market value of the items. The husband appealed,
alleging that the court's order impermissibly modified the divorce
decree. 131 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's order, stating,
"[W]hile a trial court is not authorized to modify the original decree
within a contempt proceeding, it may exercise its discretion 'to craft a
remedy for contempt, including remedying harm caused to an innocent
party by the contemptuous conduct.""'

131. Id. at 191-92, 755 S.E.2d at 552-53.
132. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(e) (2014).
133. Miles, 327 Ga. App. at 191, 755 S.E.2d at 552; see also O.C.G.A § 9-11-5(e).
134. O.C.G.A § 9-11-5(e).
135. 293 Ga. 563, 748 S.E.2d 456 (2013).
136. Id. at 563-64, 748 S.E.2d at 457.
137. Id. at 564-65, 748 S.E.2d at 457-58.
138. Id. at 564, 565, 748 S.E.2d at 457, 459 (quoting Wyatt Processing, LLC v. Bell
Irrigation, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 35, 37, 679 S.E.2d 63, 64 (2009)).
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The case of Ziyad v. El-Amin 139 is similar to Smith. In Ziyad, the
trial court found the husband in contempt based upon his failure to
refinance the debt on a residential property in his name within six
months or, if he was unable to refinance, to sell the property, as required
by the divorce decree. The trial court ordered the husband to purge the
contempt by listing the property for sale immediately. Further, the
court ordered the husband to make payments towards the principal of
the mortgage on the property until the property was sold or the
indebtedness was otherwise paid. The husband appealed, alleging that
the court's order impermissibly modified the parties' decree." 4
The supreme court upheld the trial court's order, stating that the trial
court reasonably understood the terms of the decree to mean that the
husband was obligated to place the property on the market for sale upon
terms that made it salable, and in so much as the outstanding debt
made it unsalable, the husband was required to make it salable.14 1
The trial court reasonably found that the property was unsalable at the
142
current time and could only be sold if the principal was paid down.
While the holdings in Smith and Ziyad seem to broaden a trial court's
ability to fashion remedies in contempt actions, the court's holding in
Friday v. Friday, outlined above, 14 1 places limitations on remedial
powers. In Friday,the supreme court reversed the portion of the trial
court's order associated with the mother's contempt action that required
the father to submit Qualified Domestic Relations Orders for his
retirement accounts and pay child support arrearages out of the
144
accounts.
The case of Weeks v. Weeks 145 explains an important procedure in
contempt actions. In Weeks, the father filed a contempt action against
the mother based on her violation of the child custody order. Per an
order entered on December 4, 2012, the court found the mother in
contempt and also modified the parenting plan by deleting the father's
supervised visitation requirement. The court scheduled a compliance
hearing for January 31, 2013.148
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293 Ga. 871, 750 S.E.2d 337 (2013).
Id. at 871, 750 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 872-73, 750 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. at 873, 750 S.E.2d at 339.
See supra Part VII.
Friday, 294 Ga. at 692-93, 755 S.E.2d at 712-13.
324 Ga. App. 785, 751 S.E.2d 575 (2013).
Id. at 785, 786, 751 S.E.2d at 576, 577.
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On December 4, 2012, the mother filed her request for supersedeas,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-13(a), 4 7 and also filed her notice of appeal
from the contempt order. 14 The trial court denied her request for
supersedeas, stating, "[Removal] of the visitation provision [regarding
149
supervision] was a child custody issue.,,

After the compliance

hearing, the court entered an order changing physical custody to the
father. The mother argued that it was error for the court to change
5
custody following the compliance hearing. ' The court of appeals
disagreed, stating that the order was entered subsequent to the mother's
notice of appeal filed on December 4, 2012, and therefore the order
5
changing custody could not be adjudicated in this appeal.' '
The mother also appealed the court's denial of her request for
53 The court
supersedeas."' The court of appeals upheld the denial.'
held that, despite the language of the mother's request, she appealed
only the trial court's remedy and not its finding of contempt; thus, the
mother was not challenging the finding of contempt, and her challenge
to the denial of supersedeas was moot.15

147. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-13(a) (2013) ("A judge of any trial court or tribunal having the
power to adjudge and punish for contempt shall grant to any person convicted of or
adjudged to be in contempt of court a supersedeas upon application... where the person
also submits ... written notice that he intends to seek review of the conviction or
adjudicationof contempt." (emphasis added)).
148. Weeks, 324 Ga. App. at 786, 751 S.E.2d at 577.
149. Id. at 789, 751 S.E.2d at 578 (third alteration in original) (quoting the trial court).
150. Id. at 785-86, 751 S.E.2d at 576-77.
151. Id. at 786, 751 S.E.2d at 577.
152. Id. at 788, 751 S.E.2d at 578.
153. Id. at 789, 751 S.E.2d at 578.
154. Id.

